Institutional Affiliation: Tufts University
|The Altruism Budget: Measuring and Encouraging Charitable Giving|
with Jonathan Meer: w25938
Much of the research on charitable giving has concentrated on how to increase monetary donations to a single organization. But do activities that increase donations to one non-profit or through one method come at the expense of others? This chapter examines the state of the literature on the “altruism budget.” We first discuss whether an act needs to be totally unselfish to be counted in the altruism budget. We then examine the various components that go into the altruism budget, including but not limited to monetary donations, volunteered time, and in-kind gifts. The remainder of the chapter discusses the research on whether the altruism budget is fixed across gifts to different non-profits, in different forms, or at different times. Overall, the evidence is decidedly mixed on whether the...
Forthcoming in "The Nonprofit Sector A Research Handbook, Third Edition"
|The Hired Gun Mechanism|
with James Andreoni: w17032
We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader-the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally this mechanism, despite having very small penalties out of equilibrium, reaches the full compliance equilibrium almost instantly.
|Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?|
with James Andreoni: w17033
This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. The "hired gun" mechanism (Andreoni and Gee, 2011) is an example of a low cost device that promotes complete compliances and minimal enforcement as the unique Nash equilibrium. We find that subjects are willing to pay to hire a delegated policing mechanism over 70% of the time, and that this mechanism increases welfare between 15% to 40%. Moreover, the lion's share of the welfare gain comes because the hired gun crowds out vigilante peer-to-peer punishments.
Published: “Gun For Hire: Delegated Enforcement and Peer Punishment in Public Goods Provision.” with Laura K. Gee, Journal of Public Economics, 2012, v. 96, 1036- 1046.