with : w26298
We develop a model in which, as in practice, bank debt is both a financial security used to raise funds and a kind of money used to facilitate trade. This dual role of bank debt provides a new rationale for why banks do what they do. In the model, banks endogenously perform the essential functions of real-world banks: they transform liquidity, transform maturity, pool assets, and have dispersed depositors. Moreover, they make their debt redeemable on demand. Thus, they are endogenously fragile. We show novel effects of narrow banking, suspension of convertibility, and some other policies.
|Deadlock on the Board|
with , : w26155
We develop a dynamic model of board decision-making. We show that a board could retain a policy all directors agree is worse than an available alternative. Thus, directors may retain a CEO they agree is bad—a deadlocked board leads to an entrenched CEO. We explore how to compose boards and appoint directors to mitigate deadlock. We find that board diversity and long director tenure can exacerbate deadlock. Moreover, we rationalize why CEOs and incumbent directors have power to appoint new directors: to avoid deadlock. Our model speaks to short-termism, staggered boards, and proxy access.
with , : w25946
We explain the emergence of a variety of intermediaries in a model based only on differences in their funding costs. Banks have a low cost of capital due to, say, safety nets or money-like liabilities. We show, however, that this can be a disadvantage, because it exacerbates soft-budget-constraint problems, making it costly to finance innovative projects. Non-banks emerge to finance them. Their high cost of capital is an advantage, because it works as a commitment device to withhold capital, solving soft-budget-constraint problems. Still, non-banks never take over the entire market, but coexist with banks in equilibrium.