|Wandering Astray: Teenagers' Choices of Schooling and Crime|
with , : w26858
We build and estimate a dynamic model of teenagers' choices of schooling and crime, incorporating four factors that may contribute to the different routes taken by different teenagers: heterogeneous endowments, unequal opportunities, uncertainties about one's own ability, and contemporaneous shocks. We estimate the model using administrative panel data from Chile that link school records with juvenile criminal records. Counterfactual policy experiments suggest that, for teenagers with disadvantaged backgrounds, interventions that combine mild improvement in their schooling opportunities with free tuition (by adding 22 USD per enrollee-year to the existing voucher) would lead to an 11% decrease in the fraction of those ever arrested by age 18 and a 17% increase in the fraction of those cons...
|Interaction of the Labor Market and the Health Insurance System: Employer-Sponsored, Individual, and Public Insurance|
with : w26713
We study regulations on the health insurance system for working-age U.S. households, consisting of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI), individual health insurance exchange (HIX), and Medicaid. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model with rich heterogeneity across local markets, households, and firms, which highlights the inter-relationship between various components of the health insurance system as well as their relationship with the labor market. We estimate the model exploiting variations across states and policy environments before and after the Affordable Care Act. In counterfactual experiments, we consider policies to cross subsidize between ESHI and HIX, which include pure risk pooling between the two markets as a special case. We find such policies would benefit most h...
|Government Expenditure on the Public Education System|
with , : w26425
We investigate equilibrium impacts of federal policies such as free-college proposals, taking into account that human capital production is cumulative and that state governments have resource constraints. In the model, a state government cares about household welfare and aggregate educational attainment. Realizing that household choices vary with its decisions, the government chooses income tax rates, per-student expenditure levels on public K-12 and college education, college tuition and the provision of other public goods, subject to its budget constraint. We estimate the model using data from the U.S. Using counterfactual simulations, we find that free-public-college policies, mandatory or subsidized, would decrease state expenditure on and hence the quality of public education. More st...
|Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives|
with , : w24588
We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by 1,020 euros, while a change to the top trading cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by 460 euros.
Published: Caterina Calsamiglia & Chao Fu & Maia Güell, 2020. "Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives," Journal of Political Economy, vol 128(2), pages 642-680.