Institutional Affiliation: Yale University
|Envy, Altruism, and the International Distribution of Trade Protection|
with , : w15700
One important puzzle in international political economy is why lower-earning and less-skilled intensive industries tend to receive relatively high levels of trade protection. This pattern of protection holds even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant factor of production and therefore would be expected in many standard political-economy frameworks to receive relatively low, not high, levels of protection. We propose and model one possible explanation: that individual aversion to inequality--both envy and altruism--lead to systematic differences in support for trade protection across industries, with sectors employing lower-earning workers more intensively being relatively preferred recipients for trade protection. We conduct original...
Published: “Envy, Altruism, and the International Distribution of Trade Protection,” with Xiaobo Lu and Kenneth F. Scheve, American Journal of Political Science, 56(3), 2012.