Ömer Karaduman

MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02139

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NBER Working Papers and Publications

June 2018Market Failure in Kidney Exchange
with Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton R. Featherstone: w24775
We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could increase transplants by 30%–63%. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient: most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals only partly internalize their patients' benefits from exchange, and current platforms suboptimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we calibrate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires either a mandate or a combination of new mechanisms and reimbursement reforms.

Published: Nikhil Agarwal & Itai Ashlagi & Eduardo Azevedo & Clayton R. Featherstone & Ömer Karaduman, 2019. "Market Failure in Kidney Exchange," American Economic Review, vol 109(11), pages 4026-4070.

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