|How Sticky is Retirement Behavior in the U.S.? Responses to Changes in the Full Retirement Age|
with , : w27190
We study how increases in the Social Security full retirement age (FRA) affect benefit claiming and retirement behavior, and specifically the interaction between these two choices. Using Social Security administrative data, we implement complementary research designs of a traditional cohort analysis and a regression-discontinuity design. We find that while increases in the FRA strongly and immediately shift claiming ages, retirement ages exhibit persistent "stickiness" at the old FRA of 65. We use several strategies to explore the likely mechanisms behind the stickiness in retirement, and we find suggestive evidence of a role for employers in individuals' responses to the FRA.
|Disability and Distress: The Effect of Disability Programs on Financial Outcomes|
with , : w25642
We provide the first evidence on the relationship between disability programs and markers of financial distress: bankruptcy, foreclosure, eviction, and home sale. Rates of these adverse financial events peak around the time of disability application and subsequently fall for both allowed and denied applicants. To estimate the causal effect of disability programs on these outcomes, we use variation induced by an age-based eligibility rule and find that disability allowance substantially reduces the likelihood of adverse financial events. Within three years of the decision, the likelihood of bankruptcy falls by 0.81 percentage point (30 percent), and the likelihood of foreclosure and home sale among homeowners falls by 1.7 percentage points (30 percent) and 2.5 percentage points (20 percent)...
|Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs|
with : w23472
The application process is critical to the targeting of disability programs because disability, relative to other tags, is difficult to observe and costly to verify. We study the effect of application costs on the targeting of disability programs using the closings of Social Security Administration field offices, which provide assistance with filing disability applications. Using administrative data from the Social Security Administration, we find that field office closings lead to large and persistent reductions in the number of disability recipients and reduce targeting efficiency based on current eligibility standards. The number of disability recipients declines by 13% in surrounding areas, with the largest effects for applicants with moderately severe conditions, low education levels,...
Published: Manasi Deshpande & Yue Li, 2019. "Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol 11(4), pages 213-248.