Keaton S. Miller

University of Oregon
Department of Economics
1285 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403-1285

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: University of Oregon

NBER Working Papers and Publications

February 2019Optimal Managed Competition Subsidies
with Amil Petrin, Robert Town, Michael Chernew: w25616
When markets fail to provide socially optimal outcomes, governments often intervene through ‘managed competition’ where firms compete for per-consumer subsidies. Subsidies are generally set across geographies according to estimates of the cost of government provision, a method which may not be welfare-maximizing. We introduce a framework for determining the optimal subsidy schedule that features heterogeneity in consumer preferences and inertia, and firms with heterogeneous costs that can set prices and product characteristics in response to changes in the subsidy. We apply it to the Medicare Advantage program, which offers Medicare recipients private insurance that replaces Traditional Medicare. We calculate counterfactual equilibria as a function of the subsidies by estimating policy fun...
March 2018Early Evidence on Recreational Marijuana Legalization and Traffic Fatalities
with Benjamin Hansen, Caroline Weber: w24417
Over the last few years, marijuana has become legally available for recreational use to roughly a quarter of Americans. Policy makers have long expressed concerns about the substantial external costs of alcohol, and similar costs could come with the liberalization of marijuana policy. Indeed, the fraction of fatal accidents in which at least one driver tested positive for THC has increased nationwide by an average of 10 percent from 2013 to 2016. For Colorado and Washington, both of which legalized marijuana in 2014, these increases were 92 percent and 28 percent, respectively. However, identifying a causal effect is difficult due to the presence of significant confounding factors. We test for a causal effect of marijuana legalization on traffic fatalities in Colorado and Washington with ...

Published: Benjamin Hansen & Keaton Miller & Caroline Weber, 2020. "EARLY EVIDENCE ON RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND TRAFFIC FATALITIES," Economic Inquiry, vol 58(2), pages 547-568.

August 2017Federalism, Partial Prohibition, and Cross-Border Sales: Evidence from Recreational Marijuana
with Benjamin Hansen, Caroline Weber: w23762
Marijuana is partially prohibited: though banned federally, it is available to 1 in 4 U.S. adults under state statutes. We measure the size of the interstate trade generated by state-level differences in legal status with a natural experiment: Oregon allowed stores to sell marijuana for recreational use on October 1, 2015, next to Washington where stores had been selling recreational marijuana since July 2014. Using administrative data covering the universe of Washington's sales and a differences-in-discontinuities approach, we find retailers along the Oregon border experienced a 36 percent decline in sales immediately after Oregon's market opened. We investigate the home location of recent online reviewers of marijuana retailers and find similar cross-border patterns. By the end of Washin...

Published: Benjamin Hansen & Keaton Miller & Caroline Weber, 2020. "Federalism, partial prohibition, and cross-border sales: Evidence from recreational marijuana," Journal of Public Economics, vol 187.

July 2017The Taxation of Recreational Marijuana: Evidence from Washington State
with Benjamin Hansen, Caroline Weber: w23632
The median United States voter supports the legalization of marijuana, at least in part due to a desire to increase state tax revenues. However, states with legal markets have implemented wildly different regulatory schemes with tax rates ranging from 3.75 to 37 percent, indicating that policy makers have a range of beliefs about industry responses to taxes and regulation. We examine a policy reform in Washington: a switch from a 25 percent gross receipts tax collected at every step in the supply chain to a sole 37 percent excise tax at retail. Using novel, comprehensive administrative data, we assess responses to the reform throughout the supply and consumption chain. We find the previous tax regime provided strong incentives for vertical integration. Tax invariance did not hold, with som...

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