Institutional Affiliation: Penn State
|Spillovers in Space: Does Geography Matter?|
with , , : w16188
We simultaneously assess the contributions to productivity of three sources of research and development spillovers: geographic, technology and product-market proximity. To do this, we construct a new measure of geographic proximity that is based on the distribution of a firm's inventor locations rather than its headquarters, and we report both parametric and semiparametric estimates of our geographic- distance functions. We find that: i) Geographic space matters even after conditioning on horizontal and technological spillovers; ii) Technological proximity matters; iii) Product-market proximity is less important; iv) Locations of researchers are more important than headquarters but both have explanatory power; and v) Geographic markets are very local.
Published: Sergey Lychagin & Joris Pinkse & Margaret E. Slade & John Van Reenen, 2016. "Spillovers in Space: Does Geography Matter?," The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol 64(2), pages 295-335. citation courtesy of
|Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions|
with Kenneth Hendricks, : w8294
This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium bidding in a common values model that is implemented using data on bids and ex post values. We compute bid markups and rents under the alternative hypotheses of private and common values and find that the data are more consistent with the latter hypothesis. Finally, we use data on tract location and ex post values to test the comparative static prediction in common value auctions that bidders may bid less aggressively when they expect more competition.
Published: Hendricks, Kenneth, Joris Pinkse and Robert H. Porter. "Empirical Implications Of Equilibrium Bidding In First-price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, 2003, v70(1,Jan), 115-145. citation courtesy of