|The Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides|
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We estimate valuations of time using detailed consumer choice data from a large European ride hail platform, where drivers bid on trips and consumers choose between a set of potential rides with different prices and waiting times. We estimate consumer demand as a function of prices and waiting times. While demand is responsive to both, price elasticities are on average four times higher than waiting-time elasticities. We show how these estimates can be mapped into values of time that vary by place, person, and time of day. Regarding variation within a day, the value of time during non-work hours is 16% lower than during work hours. Regarding the spatial dimension, our value of time measures are highly correlated both with real estate prices and urban GPS travel flows. A variance decomposit...
|Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction System|
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We analyze bidding data from uniform price auctions of U.S. Treasury bills and notes between July 2009-October 2013. Primary dealers consistently bid higher yields compared to direct and indirect bidders. We estimate a structural model of bidding that takes into account informational asymmetries introduced by the bidding system employed by the U.S. Treasury. While primary dealers’ estimated willingness-to-pay is higher than direct and indirect bidders’, their ability to bid-shade is even higher, leading to higher yield/lower price bids. Total bidder surplus averaged to about 3 basis points across the sample period along with efficiency losses around 2 basis points.
Published: Ali Hortaçsu & Jakub Kastl & Allen Zhang, 2018. "Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the US Treasury Auction System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(1), pages 147-169, January.
|An Empirical Analysis of Funding Costs Spillovers in the EURO-zone with Application to Systemic Risk|
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We propose a framework for estimation of spillovers between funding costs of individual banks. The estimation proceeds in three steps: First, using data from liquidity auctions of the European Central Bank, we estimate the funding costs in a given week for each individual bank. In the second step, we apply the adaptive elastic net (a LASSO type estimator) to this panel to estimate the financial network. Finally, using the estimated network we propose new measures of the systemicness and vulnerability of each bank. Our measure of systemicness has quite a natural interpretation, since it can roughly be viewed as the total externality a bank would impose on the funding costs of all other banks in the system. We estimate that most of the banks have fairly weak links and, therefore, if one were...
|The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds|
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In this paper we study European banks' demand for short-term funds (liquidity) during the summer 2007 subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central Bank's auctions for one-week loans, their main channel of monetary policy implementation. Through a model of bidding, we show that banks' behavior reflects their cost of obtaining short-term funds elsewhere (i.e., in the interbank market) as well as a strategic response to other bidders. We find considerable heterogeneity across banks in their willingness to pay for short-term funds supplied in these auctions. Accounting for the strategic component is important: while a naive interpretation of the raw bidding data may suggest that virtually all banks suffered a dramatic increase in the cost of obtaining funds in the inte...
Published: Nuno Cassola & Ali HortaÃ§su & Jakub Kastl, 2013. "The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for ShortâTerm Funds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1309-1345, 07. citation courtesy of