NBER

Geert Ridder

Department of Economics
University of Southern California
Kaprielian Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90089
Tel: 213/740-3511
Fax: 213/740-8543

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: University of Southern California

NBER Working Papers and Publications

July 2020Teacher-to-Classroom Assignment and Student Achievement
with Bryan S. Graham, Petra M. Thiemann, Gema Zamarro: w27543
We study the effects of counterfactual teacher-to-classroom assignments on average student achievement in elementary and middle schools in the US. We use the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) experiment to semiparametrically identify the average reallocation effects (AREs) of such assignments. Our findings suggest that changes in within-district teacher assignments could have appreciable effects on student achievement. Unlike policies which require hiring additional teachers (e.g., class-size reduction measures), or those aimed at changing the stock of teachers (e.g., VAM-guided teacher tenure policies), alternative teacher-to-classroom assignments are resource neutral; they raise student achievement through a more efficient deployment of existing teachers.
March 2016Identification and Efficiency Bounds for the Average Match Function under Conditionally Exogenous Matching
with Bryan S. Graham, Guido W. Imbens: w22098
Consider two heterogenous populations of agents who, when matched, jointly produce an output, `Y`. For example, teachers and classrooms of students together produce achievement, parents raise children, whose life outcomes vary in adulthood, assembly plant managers and workers produce a certain number of cars per month, and lieutenants and their platoons vary in unit effectiveness. Let `W\in\mathbb{W}={ w_1,\ldots,w_j} and X\in\mathbb{X}={ x_1,\ldots,x_k}` denote agent types in the two populations. Consider the following matching mechanism: take a random draw from the `W=w_j` subgroup of the first population and match her with an independent random draw fro...

Published: Bryan S. Graham & Guido W. Imbens & Geert Ridder, 2020. "Identification and Efficiency Bounds for the Average Match Function Under Conditionally Exogenous Matching," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, vol 38(2), pages 303-316. citation courtesy of

October 2010Measuring the Effects of Segregation in the Presence of Social Spillovers: A Nonparametric Approach
with Bryan S. Graham, Guido W. Imbens: w16499
In this paper we nonparametrically analyze the effects of reallocating individuals across social groups in the presence of social spillovers. Individuals are either 'high' or 'low' types. Own outcomes may vary with the fraction of high types in one's social group. We characterize the average outcome and inequality effects of small increases in segregation by type. We also provide a measure of average spillover strength. We generalize the setup used by Benabou (1996) and others to study sorting in the presence of social spillovers by incorporating unobserved individual- and group-level heterogeneity. We relate our reallocation estimands to this theory. For each estimand we provide conditions for nonparametric identification, propose estimators, and characterize their large sample properties...
April 2009Complementarity and Aggregate Implications of Assortative Matching: A Nonparametric Analysis
with Bryan S. Graham, Guido W. Imbens: w14860
This paper presents methods for evaluating the effects of reallocating an indivisible input across production units, taking into account resource constraints by keeping the marginal distribution of the input fixed. When the production technology is nonseparable, such reallocations, although leaving the marginal distribution of the reallocated input unchanged by construction, may nonetheless alter average output. Examples include reallocations of teachers across classrooms composed of students of varying mean ability. We focus on the effects of reallocating one input, while holding the assignment of another, potentially complementary, input fixed. We introduce a class of such reallocations -- correlated matching rules -- that includes the status quo allocation, a random allocation, and bot...

Published: Bryan S. Graham & Guido W. Imbens & Geert Ridder, 2014. "Complementarity and aggregate implications of assortative matching: A nonparametric analysis," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5, pages 29-66, 03. citation courtesy of

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