NBER

Erik Madsen

655 Knight Way, Knight Management Center
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-7298

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: New York University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

March 2014Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels
with B. Douglas Bernheim: w19993
Though economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns, important puzzles remain. Standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment, but they fail to explain two important factual observations: first, apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs; second, it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected. We propose a theory of "equilibrium price cutting and business stealing" in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation.

Published: B. Douglas Bernheim & Erik Madsen, 2017. "Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels," American Economic Review, vol 107(2), pages 387-424. citation courtesy of

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