Institutional Affiliation: Cornell Law School
|Signing Statements and Presidentializing Legislative History|
with : w23951
Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tool of strategic influence over judicial decisionmaking since the 1980s—as a way of creating “presidential legislative history” to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the courts to interpret statutes. In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive empirical examination of how courts have received presidential legislative history to date. Three main findings emerge from ...
Published: de Figueiredo, John M, and Edward H. Stiglitz (2017). “Signing Statements and Presidentializing Legislative History,” Administrative Law Review, 69(4): 841-868.
with : w21765
This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.
Published: de Figueiredo, John M., and Jed Stiglitz (2017). “Democratic Rulemaking,” in ed. Francesco Parisi, Oxford Handbook on Law and Economics, Chapter 3, Volume 3: 37-58.