Douglas Marcouiller

3900 Westminster Place
St. Louis, MO 63108
Tel: 314-306-4386

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Institutional Affiliation: Saint Louis University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

March 1999Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias: An Empirical Investigation
with James E. Anderson: w7000
Corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce trade. This paper estimates the reduction, using a structural model of import demand in which transactions costs impose a price markup on traded goods. We find that inadequate institutions constrain trade far more than tariffs do. We also find that omitting indexes of institutional quality from the model leads to an underestimate of home bias. Using a broad sample of countries, we find that the traded goods expenditure share declines significantly as income per capita rises, other things equal. Cross-country variation in the effectiveness of institutions offers a simple explanation of the observed global pattern of trade, in which high-income, capital-abundant countries trade disproportionately with one another.

Published: Anderson, James E. and Douglas Marcouiller. "Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," Review of Economics and Statistics, 2002, v84(2,May), 342-352.

October 1997Trade and Security,I: Anarchy
with James E. Anderson: w6223
Market exchange is subject to an endogenously determined level of predation which impedes specialization and gains from trade. We construct a model in which utility-maximizing agents opt between careers in production and careers in predation. Three types of equilibria may emerge: autarky (with no predation and no defense), insecure exchange equilibria (with predation and defense), and secure exchange equilibria (in which defense completely deters predation). Trading equilibria, two-thirds of them secure, are supported only in a narrow range of security parameter values. Since changes in the technologies of defense and predation have terms of trade effects, some producers may be hurt by enhanced security. We show cases of immiserizing security' in which producers in large poor countrie...

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