NBER

Daniel Bennett

Stanford University

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Stanford University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

June 2019The Political Economy of Social Security Reform
with Michael J. Boskin, Diego J. Perez: w25985
We identify which types of Social Security reforms are supported when people vote in their financial self-interest, under alternative economic and demographic projections and voting proclivity assumptions. While 40% of voters have negative lifetime net transfers, less than 10% have negative future transfers under the un- sustainable status quo. Framing the problem as a choice between reforms is necessary for any to receive majority support. Delayed reforms are often preferred, but immediate tax hikes or slower benefit growth win in some circumstances. Inter-generational AND intragenerational heterogeneity of economic interests combine to affect which reforms are blocked and which are feasible.

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