Daniel C. Waldinger

NYU Department of Economics
19 West 4th Street
Room 814
New York, NY 10012

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: New York University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

February 2019Equilibrium Allocations under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence from Deceased Donor Kidneys
with Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Michael A. Rees, Paulo J. Somaini: w25607
Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade-offs in designing these mechanisms depend on agents preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under alternative designs for the deceased donor kidney waitlist. We model the decision to accept an organ or wait for a preferable one as an optimal stopping problem and estimate preferences using administrative data from the New York City area. Our estimates show that while some kidney types are desirable for all patients, there is substantial match-specific heterogeneity in values. We then develop methods to evaluate alternative mechanisms, comparing their effects on patient welfare to an equivalent change in donor supply. Past reforms to the kidney waitlist primarily resulted in redistribution, with similar welfare and orga...

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