|Banks’ Internal Capital Markets and Deposit Rates|
with , : w21526
A common view is that deposit rates are determined primarily by supply: depositors require higher deposit rates from risky banks, thereby creating market discipline. An alternative perspective is that market discipline is limited (e.g., due to deposit insurance and/or enhanced capital regulation) and that internal demand for funding by banks determines rates. Using branch-level deposit rate data, we find little evidence for market discipline as rates are similar across bank capitalization levels. In contrast, banks’ loan growth has a causal effect on deposit rates: e.g., branches’ deposit rates are correlated with loan growth in other states in which their bank has some presence, suggesting internal capital markets help reallocate the bank’s funding.
Published: Itzhak Ben-David & Ajay Palvia & Chester Spatt, 2017. "Banks’ Internal Capital Markets and Deposit Rates," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol 52(05), pages 1797-1826. citation courtesy of
|The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting|
with , , : w15143
This paper studies the information content and consequences of third-party voting advice issued during proxy contests. We document significant abnormal stock returns around proxy vote recommendations and develop an estimation procedure for disentangling stock price effects due to changes in outcome probabilities from those due to changes in outcome-contingent valuations. We find that voting advice is a good predictor of contest outcomes and that vote recommendations appear to certify the extent to which dissidents can add value. Thus, proxy advice seems to play a dual informational role in financial markets.
Published: “Interim News and the Role of Proxy Voting Advice,” December 2010 (with C . Alexander, M . Chen and D . Seppi), Revi ew of Financial Studies , 23, 4419 - 4454.