NBER

Björn Bruegemann

VU University
Department of Economics
De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

E-Mail: b.a.brugemann@vu.nl
Institutional Affiliation: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

NBER Working Papers and Publications

August 2015Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values
with Pieter Gautier, Guido Menzio: w21508
The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game, the Rolodex Game, that follows a simple and realistic protocol and that, under some mild restrictions, admits a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium generating a profile of wages and profits that are equal to the Shapley values. The vast applied literature that refers to the Stole and Zwiebel game to give a game-theoretic foundation to the use of the Shapley values as the outcome of the bargain between a firm and multiple w...

Published: Björn Brügemann, Pieter Gautier, Guido Menzio; Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values, The Review of Economic Studies citation courtesy of

April 2007Rent Rigidity, Asymmetric Information, and Volatility Bounds in Labor Markets
with Giuseppe Moscarini: w13030
Recent findings have revived interest in the link between real wage rigidity and employment fluctuations, in the context of frictional labor markets. The standard search and matching model fails to generate substantial labor market fluctuations if wages are set by Nash bargaining, while it can generate fluctuations in excess of what is observed if wages are completely rigid. This suggests that less severe rigidity may suffice. We study a weaker notion of real rigidity, which arises only in frictional labor markets, where the wage is the sum of the worker's opportunity cost (the value of unemployment) and a rent. With wage rigidity this sum is acyclical; we consider rent rigidity, where only the rent is acyclical. We offer two contributions. First, we derive upper bounds on labor market vol...

Published: Bjoern Bruegemann & Giuseppe Moscarini, . "Rent Rigidity, Asymmetric Information, and Volatility Bounds in Labor," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics. 2010

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